Terrorist Threat Assessment Netherlands 58
The terrorist threat from right-wing terrorist movements, such as accelerationism, is unchanged. However, the size of the movement has not grown and the very disturbing expressions on the internet have not yet translated into actual attacks in the Netherlands.. It is worrying, however, that several hundred young Dutch people actively spread right-wing terrorist ideas online and worship perpetrators of terrorist attacks.. In addition, there are concerns about further normalization of right-wing extremist ideas in the social and political domain.
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Quran destruction puts the Netherlands on the radar of jihadist organizations
Global jihadist organizations have long regarded the Netherlands as a legitimate target for an attack. As a result of recent Koran destruction in our country (see box Destruction of the Koran in the Netherlands and Sweden) however, the Netherlands has come into the picture even more emphatically. Several pro-ISIS outlets have used social media to call for retaliation against Western countries, including explicitly Sweden and to a lesser extent the Netherlands. At the end of January, a media organization associated with ISKP, the Afghan branch of ISIS, threats uttered against 'infidels' in response to the Koran destruction. The Netherlands was specifically mentioned as a target. In a late February 2023 published video production, the leader of the anti-Islam movement Pegida comes into the picture. A poster was also published in the English-language magazine of ISKP containing the Dutch and Swedish flag and the call to carry out attacks on shops, among other things., police officers and music concerts.
It turned out to be no empty threats. At the beginning of February, twenty people associated with ISKP were arrested in Istanbul for planning attacks on diplomatic posts of Western countries, including the Dutch and Swedish consulate in Istanbul, and on churches and synagogues. Turkish media reported that Turkish intelligence feared that ISKP had ordered its supporters in Turkey to carry out the attacks in retaliation for Quran destruction in Sweden and the Netherlands. Nine Western countries, including the Netherlands, Sweden and the United States, had closed their consulates in Istanbul for some time the week before due to the tensions and increased threat.
Sweden locked up 11 April also removed his embassy in the Pakistani capital Islamabad for security reasons. In Sweden itself, op 4 april 2023 five men arrested on suspicion of preparing a terrorist attack. According to the Swedish security service, the potential attackers have ties to international ISIS networks through groups on Facebook. These groups contained ISIS fighters and collected money for the terrorist organization. Since the Koran burning in January, there are said to be several concrete threats of attack in Sweden. Fearing new terrorist attacks, the Swedish police increased the security of symbolically important objects, among other things. In Sweden, the threat level will remain unchanged for the time being 3 (on a scale of 5).
Jihadist organizations more often explicitly quote countries in their terrorist propaganda. Scientific research shows that this does not always lead to an increase in the number of attacks in those countries. However, the threat of attacks in Istanbul and Sweden, as well as the attacks on the editorial office of the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo, show that jihadist organizations can be guided by incidents in the West when choosing a target., which they regard as blasphemy.
Terrorist groups also use perceived blasphemy to reinforce their terrorist message and justify the use of violence. In this way they try to inspire radicalized individuals in Europe to commit an attack without having to make active preparations themselves.. Perpetrators of attacks in response to perceived blasphemy are in most cases not affiliated with terrorist groups, but usually claim to act out of personal conviction. Past attacks show that Muslims are of different religious orientation (sunni, Shiite, salafist, Sufi) may be susceptible to calls for retaliation, even if those were done years ago. So stuck in August 2022 a man the British-Indian writer Salman Rushdie several times during a lecture. The perpetrator may have been inspired by the death sentence of Rushdie, the spiritual leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini, in 1989 had pronounced after publication of the work The Satanic Verses. Half april 2023 an Islamic cleric in Pakistan posted a renewed call on social media to kill Geert Wilders. The reason for this was the drawing competition for Mohammedcartoons that Wilders entered 2018 wanted to organize.
In the short term, it carries jihadist propaganda, in which the Netherlands is explicitly mentioned as a country that is guilty of blasphemy, contributes to an increased terrorist threat against our country and our interests abroad. The threat against Dutch targets in countries where cells affiliated with ISIS are already active, is larger than in the Netherlands itself.
Op 22 January, the leader of the anti-Islam movement Pegida tore up a Quran during a demonstration in front of the temporary House of Representatives in The Hague. Op 12 February he did the same during a demonstration in Utrecht, op 22 March in Leiden and op 15 April in front of the town hall in Amsterdam. In Sweden, a Danish anti-Islam activist burned to death 21 January 2023 a Quran for the Turkish embassy. In april 2022 he already burned several Korans during a controversial tour of Sweden, which led to violent disturbances in several cities.
In several Islamic countries, the destruction of the Koran has led to angry reactions and demonstrations against Sweden and the Netherlands, among others. Anger about perceived sacrilege or blasphemy is often vented in the Netherlands within the framework of the democratic constitutional state, such as through demonstrations or petitions. In Amsterdam, the DENK party chairman asked the mayor to ban any future Koran tearing in the city. The national chapter called for a national ban on tearing up holy books.
In the past, however, extremist Muslims in Western countries have also carried out attacks in response to blasphemy, such as the attack on the editorial office of the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo (2015). The most famous example in our country is the murder of Theo van Gogh in 2004 by a member of the jihadist network the Hofstad group.
There are currently no concrete indications that people in the Netherlands are preparing an attack
Violent threat from right-wing terrorism remains conceivable
Within the Netherlands, the main right-wing extremist threat of violence comes from online followers of accelerationist and similar right-wing terrorist ideas. Accelerationism is based on the population theory.(1) Supporters want to use terrorist violence to precipitate a race war, with which the current political system can be replaced by a white ethno-state. There are probably a few hundred Dutch-speaking supporters of these ideas. This number does not seem to have increased in the past year, but there is progression within the movement. In addition, more experienced participants in online networks retreat to closed app groups with a select group of acquaintances.
The Dutch right-wing terrorist environment continues to have a low level of organisation. It mainly concerns susceptible boys and men from thirteen to the late twenties, who often have an unstable home situation and sometimes struggle with psychosocial or psychopathological problems. This problem can make it difficult to enter into social contacts in the physical world, leading them to look for digital entitlement. Online they share their own language and iconography, for example through memes (see box Memes as right-wing extremist means of communication).
New members joining online groups take inspiration from decommissioned organizations like Atomwaffen Division or The Base, loose extremist or terrorist text fragments and the actions of previous attackers. Dutch supporters of accelerationism often cut and paste pieces of ideas to put together their personal right-wing terrorist ideology (see box Extremism unpredictable due to 'cut-and-paste ideologies'). Some look for an appropriate ideology to match their lust for violence. Their shifting ideological underpinnings can make it easier to move from one online group to another, or to be a member of several groups at the same time. Because elaborated extremist ideologies are rarely discussed in these online groups, and mainly superficial violent ideas are shared and attackers are honored, these groups may be more accessible to new interested parties.
In the Netherlands, members of this right-wing terrorist online milieu have not committed any terrorist attacks. Also worldwide, the number of attacks from accelerationist corners remains relatively limited for the time being, especially in recent years.
Memes are popular within right-wing extremist groups on the internet, because they can spread far-right ideas online in a short time frame in a simple and subtle way to a wider audience, often packaged as a joke. The result of such memes may be that the content is no longer seen as problematic and becomes normalized in public debates. Right-wing extremists and terrorists share memes with a more explicit extremist content in their own online communities, such as their fascination with violence and weapons, and their admiration for right-wing terrorist attackers.
The Netherlands has historically seen little right-wing extremist violence (see box Large differences in right-wing extremist violence in Europe), but the Dutch adherents seem to be detached from this non-violent tradition due to their online activities in an international environment. This increases the risk of them resorting to violence. At the same time, the lack of organized right-wing extremist networks, that could facilitate acts of violence, have a dampening effect on the threat of violence. Finally, the young age of the group raises the question of the extent to which they are currently able to plan an attack with some complexity (see box Right-wing extremist violence rarely committed by young people in Europe).
Despite the increased attention for right-wing extremism in Europe, since 1990 there is a decrease in violence from that corner, waarbij 2021 was even one of the least violent years – whether or not because of the corona pandemic. There are large differences in right-wing extremist violence in individual European countries. In absolute numbers, most violence takes place in Germany, followed by the United Kingdom, Italy, Greece and Spain. Relative to the number of inhabitants, most violence takes place in Greece and Germany, while the Scandinavian countries also score high. Historically, the Netherlands has had very little right-wing extremist violence, with only a few known incidents of violence in between 2015 en 2022. Differences also exist in target choices: where violence in Northern Europe is mainly directed against ethnic and religious minorities, in Southern Europe, it is precisely political opponents such as anti-fascists that are attacked.
KADER – Right-wing extremist violence in Europe rarely by young people
Most right-wing extremist violence in Europe is of a different nature than the attacks that accelerationists fantasize about online. Large-scale or prepared attacks such as in Bratislava 2022 remain exceptions. According to the Norwegian scientific research company C-Rex, the 26 far-right attacks in Western Europe with fatalities between 2015 en 2022 only five perpetrators younger than 25 years involved, one of whom was a minor. No fewer than twelve perpetrators were over the age of forty. While young people in particular distribute terrorist content online, the actual attackers in Europe are often much older.
On Friday 23 december 2022 shot a French man from 69 three Kurds dead in Paris. In addition, three people were seriously injured. He declared a "pathological hatred" towards foreigners and held specific grudges against the Kurdish community. In 2021 the same man with a saber also injured several people at a refugee camp. He remains in a psychiatric institution while awaiting trial. French authorities are treating the case as a hate crime and not terrorism.
The attack shows similarities with an attack on a migrant center in Dover, England, op 30 oktober 2022. Two people were slightly injured after a 66-year-old Briton threw several firebombs. The man committed suicide shortly afterwards. This attack also probably involved psychological or psychosocial problems. Although this attack was initially not considered terrorism either, that changed after right-wing extremist messages from the perpetrator were found on social media. Both attacks appear to stem from a link between deep-rooted hatred of foreigners or Muslims and personal resentment and misfortune, negative experiences with the government and sometimes some ideological components.
However, it remains worrying that the right-wing terrorist online environment also has supporters in the Netherlands. The adherents of this idea, both in the Netherlands and abroad, can immerse themselves in rabid content for years, until a casual incident leads them to concrete violence. Due to the international ideological interconnectedness and the online nature, attacks in one country can inspire potential attackers on the other side of the world to commit a similar act. The attacker at an LGBTI bar in Bratislava in early October 2022 was initially inspired by the Christchurch attack 2019 and was killed by a right-wing terrorist attack in Buffalo, USA, in May 2022 prompted to take action. Copying behavior is actively encouraged within the right-wing terrorist online environment. This does not have to take place in the short term: research shows that right-wing terrorist copycats can take plenty of time to plan their attacks. The actual ideological, practical and psychosocial preparation for an attack can take a long time.
The alt-right movement, together with the accelerationists, form the so-called 'new generation' of right-wing extremists. In contrast to classic right-wing extremists such as neo-Nazis, supporters of this generation do not wear visible right-wing extremist symbols, clothes or hairstyles. As a result, they are much less immediately recognizable as such in public life. The alt-right movement in the Netherlands used to consist of relatively young, highly educated men. Due to, among other things, the normalization of ideas and the disappearance of groups such as Erkenbrand, this composition has changed to a more diverse group in terms of age and education level.
The new generation of right-wing extremists strives, as stated in the previous paragraph, a white ethnostate and fears the 'repopulation' of the Netherlands (and other Western countries). They often blame the changing composition of the population on the government and its institutions that deliberately and with a malicious motive promote migration. In addition, they also hold feminists and the LGBTI community responsible, because they would hinder the reproduction of the white race. Alt-right supporters currently view the use of violence to spark a race war in the short term as counterproductive to the growth of the movement. The alt-right movement mainly tries to influence public opinion and the prevailing attitudes in a country, whether or not through participation in the democratic system. By always looking for the edge of the permissible and shocking, they ensure that extremist ideas continue to normalize. The line between accelerationism and the alt-right movement is quite diffuse, especially online. Within the alt-right movement, the notion is that violence in self-defense may be unavoidable.
Due to cultural and ideological differences, but also through mutual social conflicts, the right-wing extremist landscape in the Netherlands remains fragmented. Groups often manage to pull together, with the population theory as a connecting factor.
In the past six months, it has become increasingly common to propagate right-wing extremist ideas. It openly and (virtually) uncritical discussion of xenophobic and partly racist ideas is visible on social media, but also in the political discourse, the public broadcasting system and daily life.
The projected texts on the Erasmus Bridge during the turn of the year are illustrative of the aim to normalize the right-wing extremist movement (see box Extremist laser projections in the Netherlands). By mixing activist and right-wing extremist expressions, right-wing extremist ideas are made more accessible to a wide audience. For tactical reasons, right-wing extremists not only name their own 'ethnic superiority', but they mainly emphasize that the Dutch 'cultural identity' is threatened by the arrival of migrants. For example, they point to the disappearance of 'traditions' such as the appearance of Zwarte Piet. By responding to the concerns of a larger part of the population about the loss of traditions, culture and identity, right-wing extremists try to make larger groups sensitive to the population theory.
In the Netherlands there have been since December 2022 laser projections with racist and anti-Semitic texts. These right-wing extremist laser actions serve to spread propaganda, attract new members and further normalize the ideas.
In Venlo, for example, texts were projected onto a UWV building and a shop at the end of December. Texts then appeared on the Erasmus Bridge in Rotterdam on New Year's Eve during the countdown that was shown live on TV. The right-wing extremist group that claimed this action, seems to have given the starting signal for this new modus operandi in the Netherlands, also known as projection bombing. Relatively simple and cheap means ensure a wide range, especially when it generates media attention. Both right-wing and left-wing activists abroad, particularly in the United States and the United Kingdom, have been using these types of projections for some time. A group of neo-Nazis in the US in particular seems to serve as inspiration for the projections in the Netherlands. Since the turn of the year, laser projections have been taking place in the Netherlands at the municipal office in Alkmaar (18 January), the Anne Frank House in Amsterdam (6 februari), the Hemweg power station and a hotel in Amsterdam (around 14 februari) and the municipal office in Eindhoven (during Carnival 20 februari).
Some of the projections have been claimed by a small but radical network of Nazi sympathizers with close ties to other far-right and right-wing extremist groups. There is no threat of violence from this group, but some group members do participate in Telegram groups where there is speculation about the perpetration of right-wing extremist attacks. Several suspects have been arrested on suspicion of involvement in the projections.
The alt-right movement challenges the fundamental rights of groups in society and thus undermines the democratic legal order. Where supporters generally try to disguise their more extreme and violent ideas from the wider public, such expressions are shared in increasingly larger online groups. They label violence there as justified under the guise of “self-defense” or “necessary evil”.
Supporters of the alt-right movement are preparing in various ways for what they see as an inevitable violent confrontation with their opponents. Sometimes this seems harmless. In these circles, for example, people practice physical training together or otherwise to purify the body and keep it fit, but also to gain combat skills. It becomes more problematic when trying to obtain weapons. In DTN 56 has already been mentioned the interest of right-wing extremists in 3D-printed weapons. Arrests in February 2023 (see box Extremist laser projections in the Netherlands) a crossbow and 3D-printed crossbow parts were seized from two suspects. Right-wing extremists are also interested in membership of shooting clubs. It is also worrying that some of them aspire to a job in the Ministry of Defence.
The MIVD sees since 2020 increased interest among right-wing extremists to work for the armed forces. Right-wing extremism could pose a threat to the deployability of the armed forces and to the democratic legal order.
With anti-institutional extremists, but also among right-wing extremists, defined ideologies are increasingly giving way to individual cut-and-paste ideologies. This occurs when individuals combine loose fragments of different extremist ideologies into their own personal beliefs. These fragments of ideas can complement each other, but can sometimes seem to contradict each other. For example, supporters of conspiracy theories about an evil elite may contain elements of right-wing extremism, incel culture, spiritualism, or mix Christian and cultural traditionalism in their ideology. Global connectivity through social media and other online platforms is a major contributor to these cut-and-paste ideologies: susceptible individuals will always find something that suits them in an almost unlimited supply of extremist ideas. They form their own extremist profile by picking precisely those elements from the ideological offer, that justify their own dissatisfaction. Regardless of their personal cut-and-paste ideologies, anti-institutional extremists do share a number of common elements, such as belief in conspiracy theories and an aversion to the established order.
Unclear, changing and mixed views often go hand in hand with personal grievances, very negative experiences with the government and psychological problems. Such factors may make some individuals more susceptible to extremist ideas. The mixing of bouts of ideology with resentment or personal problems makes it more difficult to recognize extremism as such, and makes the threat more unpredictable.
